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Sewer gas claimed the lives of three
men in New York City on September 12,
1892. Their deaths signaled a warning
against the dangers of what lurked under-
ground in the city’s extensive network of
sewers:
He had scarcely reached the bottom when he
gave a cry for help. Thomas Kane and a num-
ber of others living near by went to the scene
and lent their aid. A rope was lowered to
Vollinski, and he managed to grasp it and was
drawn up to the opening, when he became
unconscious and fell back. Then Kane went
down for him and was overcome by the gas
also [1]. 
In the 1880s and 1890s, Americans
regarded sewer gas to be lethal. It was a
real public enemy, confirmed by scientists,
and it killed thousands each year across
the country. Plumbers, doctors, and the
general public spoke passionately about
sewer gas, referring to it as “slayer,”
“intruder,” and “assassin.” Frank Hastings
Hamilton eloquently wrote in 1882 about
the dangers of sewer gas according to his
personal experiences and observations as a
physician:
When I assert that it is a daily experience with
me to see persons whose general health is suf-
fering from this poison, as manifested by
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For roughly forty years, from 1870 to 1910, Americans recognized and feared gases ema-
nating from sewers, believing that they were responsible for causing an array of diseases.
Fears of sewer gas arose from deeper anxieties toward contact with decomposing organ-
ic matter and the vapors emitted from such refuse. These anxieties were exacerbated by
the construction of sewers across the country during the mid-to-late-nineteenth century,
which concentrated waste emanations and connected homes to one another. The result
was the birth of sewer gas and the attribution of sickness and death to it, as well as the
development of a host of plumbing devices and, especially, bathroom fixtures, to combat
sewer gas. The rise of the germ theory, laboratory science, and belief in disease specifici-
ty, however, transformed the threat of sewer gas, eventually replacing it (and the larger fear
of miasmas) with the threat of germs. The germ theory framework, by 1910, proved more
suitable than the sewer gas framework in explaining disease causation; it is this suitability
that often shapes the relationship between science and society.
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Copyright © 2005. All rights reserved.malaise, loss of appetite and strength, slight
febrile symptoms, diarrhea, physical and
mental depression; and that I have seen
infants, children, and adults suffering from
diphtheria, scarlet fever of a mild type, com-
plicated with this disease and destroying life;
those in vigorous health, students in colleges,
ambitious and active young men in the pro-
fessions or in the commercial or financial
world, stricken down by typhoid fever, some
struggling through the disease and others
dying; and that the cause has been demon-
strated to be this poison — I only state facts
which are common in the experiences of all
physicians in the city [2]. 
Similar reports sprung up across the
country, mostly in urban centers, begin-
ning in the 1870s. Popular periodicals, sci-
entific journals, newspapers, and hygiene
manuals preached the gospel of sewer gas
to a large audience increasingly interested
in domestic hygiene and sanitary science.
“The Sewer-Gas Danger: an Invisible
Enemy in Our Homes,” read one New York
Times headline in 1878 [3]. In the Atlantic
Monthly, nationally renowned sanitarian
and engineer George E. Waring, Jr., chal-
lenged his audience to recognize that even
“Under the most favorable conditions, the
contained air of a soil-pipe must be offen-
sive, and is likely to become dangerous”
[4]. Waring’s phrasing suggests the extent
to which the disgusting was self-evidently
conflated with the pathogenic.
Figure 1 [5] demonstrates that a truly
significant number of titles and headlines
included the terms “sewer gas” or “sewer
air” in American journals, books, and
newspapers beginning in 1870. More pre-
cisely, 283 titles and headlines included
mention of sewer gas or sewer air between
1870 and 1909. Between 1800 and 1870
only five such references were found, and
only nine appeared from 1910 until 1927.
This quantitative finding reveals the extent
to which sewer gas awareness and fears
heightened in the late 1870s and early
1880s, only to completely dissipate by
1910. The second peak in the figure,
occurring in the 1890s, represents a rise in
articles questioning the reality and danger
of sewer gas, as discussed later. 
The trends in Figure One prompt an
investigation into the rise and fall of sewer
gas. How and why did sewer gas fears
come about in America? Were they put in
motion by scientific discoveries and/or
broader social developments? What exact-
ly did sewer gas represent for Americans
in the 1870s and 1880s? How and why did
it disappear from professional and popular
literature in the twentieth century after
investigations in the mid-1890s?
To be sure, sewer gas makes no sense
today; it is not recognized by professionals
— and is not feared by the lay public — as
being the cause of specific diseases.
Although the gases of sewers may cause
dizziness and internal discomfort when
inhaled, they do not contain significant
numbers of microorganisms capable of
causing specific diseases. Moreover, the
true causes of contagious disease, it is now
believed, are pathogenic microorganisms
that do not and cannot float around at a
great distance in emanations from organic
matter. From the start of the twentieth cen-
tury onwards, specific contagious diseases
were no longer attributed to diffuse air-
borne entities but to specific microbes
traveling in liquids and solids or in
coughed or sneezed droplets. From today’s
perspective, sewer gas epitomizes the
social construction of a convenient but
irrational scapegoat for the spread of dis-
ease, a myth that lasted from roughly 1870
to 1910.
But for the American city dweller in
the 1880s, sewer gas was as real as many
other sources of diseases for his descen-
dants a century later. Today an excess of
apples can be carcinogenic, bare-footed
children can cause illness at preschools,
and public telephones carry and serve to
disseminate millions of different microbes,
conclusions largely corroborated by scien-
tific experiments. Thus, the “sewer gas
76 An: Sewer gasphenomenon” still exists in society today,
although in different guises. This is not to
say that present-day etiologies are faulty
and will, sooner or later, be disproved, but
rather that deep-seated sociocultural anxi-
eties encourage the construction of certain
kinds of disease threats. For example, the
fear of germs on public pay phones is root-
ed in a deep-seated disgust for contact with
bodies of unknown origin. One can only
speculate whether a particular phone has
been used by someone with a contagious
disease. In the same way, late-nineteenth-
century Americans were weary of sewer
gas, which had the capability of traveling
through the city from filthy, disease-ridden
homes to clean, sanitary ones. These puta-
tive means of transmission — sewer gas
and public telephones — undergo investi-
gation and scrutiny in the form of person-
al experiences and scientific experimenta-
tion, at which point their legitimacy is
either strengthened or undercut.
In 1997, CBS investigated the ubiqui-
tous presence of bacteria on common sur-
faces such as ATM keypads, handrails, and
public pay phones. Reporter John Roberts,
with the aid of microbiologist Carl Batt of
Cornell University, found that half of all
surfaces tested in New York City had at
least one form of pathogenic bacteria on
them. Such discoveries were repeated in
San Francisco and in the less-crowded city
of Lincoln, Nebraska. The conclusion was
that touching that which had been touched
by untold numbers of strangers posed seri-
ous risks to health: “It’s possible, very
possible, to get sick from a pay phone,”
said Batt [6]. 
While public pay phones, then, are far
from being denied as a source of disease,
they are akin to sewer gas in that contem-
porary frameworks for disease etiology
corroborate their relation to disease. The
present framework for disease causation
dictates that the presence of harmful
microbes (determined by laboratory sci-
ence) is equated with disease. Moreover,
public telephones and sewer gas both
serve as links, potentially connecting the
healthy to the sick. A radically different
framework in the future, in theory, may
deem public pay phones completely harm-
less, but the distaste for contact with the
unknown will remain and be transferred
elsewhere.
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Figure 1. Sewer gas literature, 1870-1909.BUILDING UP TO SEWER GAS:
THE PROBLEM OF WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND DRAINAGE IN
URBAN AMERICA
The fear of sewer gas can be traced to
the urbanization of the United States in the
mid-1800s. As cities across America
rapidly grew in size, often tripling in pop-
ulation within a few decades, public waste
management developed under the auspices
of municipal governments and public
health boards. Privately-managed waste
systems were deemed hazardous, by the
Philadelphia Board of Health, for exam-
ple, because of the inefficiency with which
urban dwellers removed solid and liquid
wastes from residences [7]. This was less
of a problem in rural settings where pri-
vately-owned cesspools, located tens of
meters from the home, did not emanate
foul smells that could be detected by near-
by persons. In cities, however, cesspools
located directly beneath tenement housing
generated foul odors and gases easily
detected by city dwellers in the vicinity.
Recognizing the health hazards asso-
ciated with moist, swampy land, the public
worked with municipal officials in order to
induce better drainage in the city. This
took the form of erecting simple ditches,
open-air wooden troughs along roads, and
pipes underground, which carried excess
liquid material outside of the city. For
example, in 1840 in Charleston, South
Carolina, officials mandated that many of
the city’s roads be reworked into a convex
shape so that runoff (mud and rainwater)
would travel from the center of streets into
wooden troughs found on the sides and
into larger sewer drains. In Manchester,
New Hampshire, city officials required
private drains to be built of stone, brick,
iron, or “sound plank” at least two inches
in diameter so as not to allow leakage of
runoff into streets and residential areas [8]. 
Such arrangements, however, led to
the private use of public drains in order to
remove private cesspool waste. As a result,
cities such as Springfield, Illinois created
laws against such practices, issuing fifty-
dollar fines for depositing private wastes,
especially water closet waste, into public
sewers.
The establishment of drainage sys-
tems and laws against mixing private and
public waste in sewers in mid-nineteenth-
century American cities indicates a larger
underlying fear: the fear of contact with
stagnant waste. Fecal and liquid wastes
were intolerable and deemed serious
health hazards that had to be whisked
away, especially in places where waste
build-up was rapid in densely-populated
areas. Such fears are evidenced in New
York City where city officials deplored “a
jumble of ill-constructed sewer lines, built
at different times for the purpose of drain-
ing off storm water, [which] could not ade-
quately bear the burden of waste
removal.” One doctor in 1849 cited the
unhealthy living conditions of Manhattan
created by “these thirty thousand
cesspools studding it up and down, and
filling the atmosphere with nauseous
gases” [9]. 
To collect waste in a systematic way
was an essential practice, but to transport
it elsewhere so that its emanations could
not reach human populations was even
more important. As such, sewer projects
were massively undertaken across
American cities from the 1840s through to
the end of the century. Chicago’s first san-
itation system, built in 1855 under the
direction of Ellis Sylvester Chesbrough,
provides one case study revealing the
practical implications of the fear of stag-
nant waste: sewers.
SEWERING CHICAGO: ERASING
OLD PROBLEMS AND CREATING
NEW ONES
Chicagoans had long recognized the
unfavorable natural topography of the
city: its flat, non-porous terrain did not
78 An: Sewer gasallow for natural runoff of storm water or
absorption. Instead, in rainy weather,
runoff built up on the surface of the land,
forming swamps and overflowing
cesspools across the city. These observa-
tions, along with the advent of a succes-
sion of cholera and dysentery epidemics in
the early 1850s, prompted officials to act
immediately. The Illinois legislature creat-
ed the Chicago Board of Sewerage
Commission on February 14, 1855, to help
sewer the city in its entirety with the pur-
pose of effectively removing waste. The
Sewerage Commission selected
Chesbrough, the commissioner of
Boston’s water works, to head the project.
After resigning from his position in
Boston, Chesbrough came to Chicago and
soon thereafter produced a report to the
Sewerage Commission on his plans for the
sewering of Chicago. The 1855 report rep-
resents the first comprehensive sewerage
system undertaken by any major city in the
United States [10]. 
Chesbrough made his goals clear at
the beginning of the report:
As the main object of the sewers is to
improve and preserve the health of the city, it
is very obvious that all substances should be
received into them which would have a con-
trary effect, if not drained off. As a conse-
quence, all stagnant water, all liquids from
kitchens and manufactories, and the contents
of all privies, should be admitted into them. 
Chesbrough stated that sewers were
the answer to the problem of stagnant
water, liquid waste, and fecal waste. He
recommended they be constructed in
Chicago for the expressed purpose of
improving and preserving the “health of
the city.” He estimated that their construc-
tion would cost roughly three million dol-
lars. The actual cost of the project, execut-
ed through the 1860s, far exceeded such
estimates, although exact figures are
unknown. Louis P. Cain notes that the
mere raising of brick buildings in Chicago
above previous levels (in order to make
room for the construction of sewers) cost
ten million dollars.
Whatever the precise monetary cost
of such an endeavor, the price that the city
of Chicago was willing to pay for its sew-
ering indicates the far-reaching conse-
quences of the fear of emanations pro-
duced by stagnant wastes. However, these
fears were not entirely erased with the
construction of massive sewer systems.
Americans soon discovered that their solu-
tions to such fears in themselves became
locales for the production of something
they called sewer gas. Chesbrough inge-
niously foresaw such developments,
encouraging the ventilation of Chicago’s
sewers in order to prevent sewer gas
explosions in the city. He proposed that
catch basins be constructed in order to col-
lect sand and other heavy substances that
would otherwise clog city sewers.
Chesbrough feared that clogged sewers
would lead to pressure-driven gas exhala-
tions from the sewers. In Chesbrough’s
words, catch basins “are so constructed as
to prevent offensive gasses [sic] from
escaping into the streets” [12].
Chesbrough’s concern represented a
larger problem that accompanied the con-
struction of sewers across America: the
problem of sewer gas. Sewer gas was
problematic because, just like the emana-
tions from stagnant waste matter, it gave
off an offensive odor. If this odor could
have been completely contained within the
pipes of sewer systems, the fear of sewer
gas might never have arisen. However, the
connection of sewer pipes to individual
homes and apartments created circum-
stances that fed pre-existing fears of nox-
ious gases and communicable diseases.
With the development of sewer systems,
then, fears of wastes did not subside;
instead, they were reconstructed to fit the
framework of civil engineering and waste
disposal. The construction of sewers dur-
ing the urbanization of America paved the
way for the construction of sewer gas,
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offensive odors emitted by stagnant liquid
and fecal matter.
CONSTRUCTING SEWER GAS:
SOCIAL ANXIETIES AND
HOUSEHOLD HEALTH
In addition to the sewer’s contribution
to the development of the notion of sewer
gas, social anxieties heightened awareness
and fears of such ubiquitous gases.
Sewers, noted the affluent and the relative-
ly healthy, connected the havens of the
upper class to the poisonous dwellings of
the lower class. Previously erected as
independent complexes, houses and apart-
ments across cities were directly or indi-
rectly connected to one another by way of
drain pipes and sewer canals underground
beginning in the 1850s. Such sewer sys-
tems, in effect, made possible the move-
ment of stagnant wastes and noxious ema-
nations from complex to complex or, more
specifically, from disease-ridden homes of
the lower classes to clean homes of the
wealthy. This realization heightened fears
of sewer gas, because unseen connections
via pipes enabled even the most sanitary
home to be invaded by sickness and dis-
ease. Indeed, the sewer — created to be
the savior of the city — brought trouble to
urbanites by connecting homes and build-
ings with one another, making sewer gas
nearly impossible to avoid.
Dr. Fordyce Barker, President of the
New York Academy of Medicine in 1882,
discussed sewer gas’s effect on the rich
and the poor, noting that “The special poi-
sons to which I now refer are the gases
resulting from defective plumbing, to
which all classes — the poor occupants of
tenement — houses, those who are able to
command the necessaries and many of the
luxuries of life, and those who live in the
most expensive houses, and whose riches
can buy everything but health-care
exposed” [13]. James E. Serrell, New
York’s chief city engineer, in the late
1870s, regarded sewer gas to be “more
deadly than the midnight assassin”
because of the “deadly effects claimed to
be produced by the sewer gases passing
into the dwellings of our citizens of all
classes” [14].
In an environment in which the home
powerfully represented the individual’s
safeguard and well-being and served as
both a status symbol and social marker, it
is not surprising that class tension was
linked to domestic sanitation. According
to historian Nancy Tomes, “Affluent
Americans were a peculiarly house-proud
people, for whom owning a home, furnish-
ing it tastefully, and running it efficiently
were badges of respectability” [15]. One
aspect of respectability was the health of
not only the family, but the home itself,
which was a reflection of one’s personal
hygiene and, thus, social status.
Immaculate personal hygiene, during the
second half of the 1800s, was less a matter
of tradition and habit and more a reflection
of enlightenment and self-discipline. The
idea that one’s clean, respectable, sanitary
home might be undone by emanations
from filthy slums made sewer gas fear-
some and despicable.
CONSTRUCTING SEWER GAS:
EPIDEMICS AND SPECIFIC
DISEASES
The threat of epidemic diseases in the
late-nineteenth century increased the per-
ceived danger of sewer gas. While sewers
were an “irritating reminder that the poor
and marginal, by way of sewers, could still
impart their ordure to the noses of the
upper classes,” the sewer gas inside them
only became fully culpable for disease
when epidemic outbreaks prompted epi-
demiological and etiological inquiry [16].
In an atmosphere of frequent epidemics,
widespread belief in the miasmatic theory
of disease, and an obsession with sanita-
80 An: Sewer gastion and hygiene, one concrete culprit was
sought for all diseases so that future epi-
demics could be avoided. That culprit was
sewer gas: “There have been of late so
many deaths from diphtheria, typhus fever
and other fatal disease caused by poiso-
nous sewer and other gases penetrating
both the homes of the wealthy and the
poor” [17]. Class fears were substantiated
by medical evidence that sewer gas caused
an array of specific diseases.
Diphtheria and typhoid fever were
more closely linked to the presence of
sewer gas by doctors, engineers, and
plumbers in the last three decades of the
nineteenth century than any other diseases.
In New York City, diphtheria was the
fourth-leading killer and typhoid the
eighth-leading killer of city dwellers from
1868 to 1872 [18]. Diarrhea (ranked sec-
ond) and scarlet fever (ranked third) were
also associated with sewer gas by experts.
A typhoid fever epidemic at the
Maplewood Institute in Pittsfield,
Massachusetts served to heighten aware-
ness of a precursor of sewer gas: foul
gases from stagnant waste. In the summer
of 1864, 66 of 74 resident students at the
Maplewood Institute for girls complained
of dizziness or some other physical anom-
aly. Fifty-one of the 66 were diagnosed
with typhoid fever, a rate of 69 percent
with regard to the entire school popula-
tion. The surrounding town of Pittsfield,
with a population of 8,000, reported just
eight typhoid fever cases the same sum-
mer. The discovery of swampy land next
to the school building and stagnant waste
in a nearby barn led to conclusions that
noxious emanations had killed thirteen of
the students at Maplewood. George E.
Waring, Jr., the most widely acclaimed
sanitarian in the country, concluded, “The
injurious influence of decomposing azo-
tized matter, in either predisposing to or
exciting severe disease, and particularly
typhoid fever, is universally admitted
among high medical authorities.”
Waring cited the Maplewood incident
in 1870 to emphasize the reality of
“sewage and cess-pool diseases.” By link-
ing foul waste matter with actual epi-
demics and known diseases, Waring both
affirmed and promoted sewer gas fears. In
the same treatise, Waring reminded his
readers of President Buchanan’s near
encounter with “intestinal or enteric fever”
in 1857 brought about by sewer gas. In
that instance, several guests attending
Buchanan’s inauguration fell ill suddenly
at the National Hotel in Washington, D.C.
Investigators at first suspected food or
drink poisoning to be the cause of the inci-
dent, but later concluded that sewer gas
had infiltrated the hotel and sickened the
guests there. Waring writes,
Poison was suspected, but a rigorous investi-
gation brought the committee appointed for
the purpose, and all the medical attendants
upon cases, to the belief that the disease was
due to sewer-gases. The drain of the privy
was found to be obstructed; and the foul ema-
nations were driven back, poisoning many
who inhaled them. On removing the obstruc-
tions, the effluvia and the cause of the disease
disappeared [19]. 
Waring’s account demonstrates the
perceived link between epidemics and
sewer gas. The correlation between sewer
gas and known, specific diseases, by 1870,
allowed sewer gas to develop into a con-
crete entity.
Interestingly, such forces were set in
motion before the precise nature of sewer
gas was even studied. The vagueness with
which sewer gas was described is striking,
especially in contrast with the boldness
with which the effects of sewer gas were
portrayed. For example, in 1882, Dr. Frank
Hamilton struggled to define sewer gas:
What is “sewer-gas”? This term has been
employed a long time by chemists, sanitari-
ans, plumbers, and others, to indicate the
ordinary emanations from sewers; but recent-
ly certain gentlemen have taken exceptions to
the term, denying that there is any such thing
as sewer-gas “having a peculiar and definite
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is probably that no intelligent man or educat-
ed physician ever thought otherwise [20]. 
After having failed to clearly identify
the nature of sewer gas, Hamilton emphat-
ically cited it for causing typhoid fever and
diphtheria: “… sewer-gas causes more
typhoid fever than all other causes com-
bined.… Diphtheria must be classed
among the diseases which in all probabili-
ty are, in many cases, caused or conveyed
by sewer-gas.”
How could the effects of sewer gas be
so clear yet the perpetrator unidentifiable?
Hardly the exception, such a pattern often
shapes the methodology of scientific dis-
covery: experience and observation
prompt etiological inquiry whose initial
answers are constructed to fit pre-existing
forces. In retrospect, erroneous models
appear foolish, yet they can be contextual-
ized within a larger social framework.
The case of sewer gas was, as such, as
social forces worked to formulate an enti-
ty perfectly suited to meet their immediate
needs. A natural abhorrence for foul odors
emitted by waste matter — especially in
light of their relation to disease — led to
the necessary construction of sewers
because of the rise of waste in densely-
populated areas. However, this measure
produced other complications as sewers
themselves, products of technological
prowess and genius from the days of the
Roman Empire, concentrated noxious
gases and propagated them underground
throughout urban landscapes and residen-
tial networks. The possibility that these
fatal odors could enter one’s home through
sewer pipes confirmed and exacerbated
pre-existing fears of noxious odors pro-
duced by stagnant wastes outdoors and in
cesspools. The production of a network of
excremental waste transport led to the cre-
ation of sewer gas.
Another way to understand the con-
struction of sewer gas is to perceive it as a
scapegoat, by 1870, onto which broader
social and cultural anxieties were trans-
ferred. A historical example of fears trans-
ferring from one agent to another lies in
the work of Theobald Smith, who “trans-
ferred the fear of an important group of
diseases to a fear of their intermediate
insect hosts” [21]. Smith discovered in
1889 that ticks carried the microbe that
caused Texas cattle fever, effectively con-
tributing to the transfer of fear of the dis-
ease itself to its vector. Similarly, the fear
of smallpox was transferred to an acute
fear of the Chinese population of San
Francisco during smallpox epidemics
there in 1868, 1876, 1881, and 1887 [22].
White San Franciscans directed their fear
of smallpox toward visible Chinese popu-
lations, unjustifiably quarantining the
Chinese.
In a similar fashion, anxieties con-
cerning contagious diseases and relatively
lower, “dirtier” classes were transferred to
sewer gas. The dread of epidemic diseases
and a disdain for the unhygienic poor
turned into an additional fear of sewer gas.
That it was housed in sewers and propa-
gated throughout cities in a network made
its role as potential killer complete. In con-
clusion, sewer gas was an entity known
not by its precise nature, but by the conve-
nience with which it provided an answer
for a wide range of anxieties in the second
half of the nineteenth century.
SEWER GAS AND THE 
WHITE HOUSE
President James A. Garfield’s fatal ill-
ness in 1881 epitomizes the fearful and
suspicious public attention devoted to
sewer gas in late-nineteenth-century
America. On July 2, 1881, President
Garfield was shot by Charles Guiteau, a
Stalwart. The Stalwarts were anti-reform,
conservative Republicans, including
spoilsmen with whom Garfield was at
odds. They desired Vice-President Chester
A. Arthur to be President.
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bullet wound to the back near his spine.
With the wounds cleaned with alcohol and
temporary dressings applied, Garfield was
transported to the White House where he
would remain through the summer, bedrid-
den. Physicians decided not to remove the
bullet because their prognosis was exceed-
ingly pessimistic: he was going to die at
any moment. But in fact, Garfield survived
for at least two more months, his condition
wavering between relative comfort and
excruciating pain and numbness. He
remained a patient in the White House.
During this time the air surrounding
the Potomac flats was thought to cause
malaria. Moreover, the White House itself
was closely scrutinized for the possibility
that its allegedly faulty construction and
plumbing would worsen the President’s
already dire condition. “Rotten timbers in
its basement and green, slimy brickwork
were vividly described in Congress. Adis-
tinguished engineer came to look at the
venerable plumbing” [23].
The engineer was George E. Waring,
Jr., called in mid-August to ascertain
whether sewer gas was infiltrating the
White House because of the mansion’s
antiquated plumbing. His name was intro-
duced by Attorney General Wayne
MacVeigh and approved by Colonel
Almon F. Rockwell, both a doctor and
engineer, in charge of coordinating the
President’s recovery. Waring was invited
not only in response to the President’s con-
dition, but also in response to First Lady
Lucretia Garfield’s developing fever, pur-
portedly caused by the air of the Potomac
Flats and the defective plumbing of the
White House. Recent allegations of the
White House’s unsanitary condition, made
in the late 1870s, further made Waring’s
visit imperative. In 1879, the officer in
charge of the White House building and
grounds noted the defective nature of the
mansion’s plumbing and convinced
Congress to provide funding for new
plumbing devices. Newly-developed
water traps to exclude sewer gas and water
closets were among the several devices
installed, yet suspicions of the White
House’s cleanliness remained.
After a week’s investigation of the
premises, Waring issued a preliminary
report to Rockwell on August 23, 1881.
The report dramatically described the
White House’s sanitary problems at
length. For example, the basement kitchen
sink contained a filthy water trap so large
that it was itself a cesspool. Upstairs, traps
were improperly installed and the bath-
rooms were unventilated. In addition, the
room adjacent the President’s chambers
contained a bathroom that utilized an anti-
quated pan closet. Pan closets possessed
no water-flushing mechanisms and instead
comprised a pan like trough into which
urine and excrement were dumped. The
pan was then manually tilted to allow the
waste to slide, by gravity, into a larger
container connected to the soil pipe. The
soil pipe ran through the entire complex.
Waring found it to be unventilated.
Although no public report was made
immediately and White House officials
did not acknowledge the role of sewer gas
in causing the President harm, Waring’s
report encouraged Garfield to move from
his current residence to the outdoors.
Garfield thus begged for a change of
scene, and, the Garfields being believers in
the therapeutic effects of sea air, moved to
Elberon, New Jersey, to a summer house
along the beach. On September 6, the
President was carried on a stretcher from
his room to a wagon to the local railroad
station where he took a train to Elberon.
The move proved wise at first — his con-
dition seemed to improve — but soon
thereafter Garfield vomited uncontrollably
and developed chills and high fever.
Garfield died two weeks after moving out
of the White House, on September 19,
1881. The autopsy reported that his death
was caused by an aneurysm of the splenet-
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never removed.
However, rumors soon spread that the
President had died because of the infiltra-
tion of sewer gas into the White House.
President Arthur, Garfield’s successor,
refused to live in the mansion until the
plumbing was redone. Waring’s report to
Rockwell was published in the New York
Times in October 1881 [24], and immedi-
ate measures were taken to begin recon-
struction. During both the Garfield and
Arthur administrations, over $110,000 was
spent on White House maintenance, a fig-
ure larger than any other since the White
House’s destruction by the British during
the War of 1812.
Even the President of the United
States in his luxurious mansion could die
of defective plumbing and sewer gas poi-
soning. By the early 1880s sewer gas’s
effects were widely recognized, especially
among doctors and sanitary experts. The
role of sewer gas as a concrete entity able
to cause disease had finally been realized,
a product of fear of disease and a repulsion
and anxiety toward contact with bodily
waste and with the filthy masses.
THE BATHROOM AS A
BATTLEFRONT: FROM FIGHTING
SEWER GAS TO FIGHTING GERMS
The architectural revolution of the
private bathroom in late-nineteenth-centu-
ry America demonstrates the practical
impact of sewer gas fears on the household
level. The American bathroom — the toi-
let, sink, bathtub, accessories, and tiled
floors and walls — serves as a case study
in order to unveil the private response to
sewer gas threats in urban America. It is
also in the bathroom that the sewer gas
framework began to break down in favor
of a newly-understood microbial frame-
work due to, primarily, laboratory experi-
mentation. One concerned “Layman” of
Philadelphia wrote in 1887,
The nature of sewer gas, the way in
which it is generated, how it enters our
homes, and its effect on the human system
are now so well understood that it is
unnecessary to enlarge upon that topic.
The ingenuity of Anglo-Saxon mechanics
has easily met the requirements of the sci-
entists and provided the means to prevent
sewer gas from entering our homes.
But there is another source of pollu-
tion present in almost every house which
has not yet received the general recogni-
tion it deserves … bacteria [25]. 
Was “Layman” right to boast of
humankind’s understanding of sewer gas?
What were some of the “Anglo-Saxon
mechanics” that allegedly defeated it? And
how did a preoccupation with germs come
into conflict with and overtake America’s
thirty-year-old preoccupation with sewer
gas? While the enemy in the bathroom was
sewer gas alone for many years, beginning
in the 1880s both sewer gas and germs
were targeted for exclusion and eradica-
tion. By 1910, only the latter would
oppose the American householder in the
bathroom, although bathroom hygiene and
cleanliness were rooted in sanitary prac-
tices stemming from earlier sewer gas
fears. The bathroom provides a concrete
locale where sewer gas fears were highly
evident, acted upon, and then replaced by
fears of germs.
In 1870 one could enter an upper-mid-
dle class bathroom to find a room not
much different from a lavishly-furnished
master bedroom: ornate furniture, stylish
mirrors, lush carpets, and toilets and bath-
tubs in wooden boxes, presented in such a
way to mimic living room furniture.
Bathrooms of the middle and lower class-
es contained simpler furniture but the
overall look mirrored any other room in
the home [26]. 
The development of public water sys-
tems and sewers enabled the bathroom to
come from outside (as privies) and into
private homes beginning in the middle of
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major problem confronted architects and
engineers: the problem of unhealthful and
unpleasant odors. While convenience pro-
pelled the development of the indoor bath-
room, a certain distaste for and fear of
excremental odors marked the only side
effect for these technological advances. As
a result, engineers and sanitarians worked
together to remedy these side effects. In
sum, “Hundreds of designs for water clos-
ets and flushing devices were patented in
the 1870s and 1880s; the 1884 catalogue
of the Meyer-Sniffen Company presented
no less than thirty-three different versions
of the sanitary water closet, from the sim-
plest to the most elaborate” [27]. 
Initial efforts focused on the water
closet and its structure. A prevalent early
model was the pan closet which comprised
a dry, pan-like structure situated to collect
excrement. By pushing a lever one tilted
the pan so that its contents slid into a small
pool of water below. This pool of excre-
ment and water would remain so until
manually removed either daily or weekly,
rendering the pan closet unsanitary: “The
pan closet was very commonly used but
universally condemned by sanitarians
because the lower waste receptacle
retained hidden filth and the moveable pan
arrangement permitted escape of impure
air” [28]. The model was popular because
is was cheap and easily installed; it was,
however, short-lived because it failed to
keep unpleasant odors out of the bath-
room. Fecal air could rise when the pan
was momentarily tilted. Waring fiercely
opposed the pan closet, colorfully stating,
[The pan closet] probably is not, but it cer-
tainly might be, the invention of the devil.…
Immediately below the copper pan there is a
chamber of horrors known to the trade as the
“container,” and a container indeed it is! It
contains what it pretends to remove, until no
other utensil of human economy is one-half
so foul.… When the pan is thrown down,
after use, the pent-up gases escape through
the seat with a stifling whiff familiar to all
who have been subjected to it — as who in a
modern city has not been [29]?
The hopper closet served as an
improvement over the pan closet by the
1870s. In place of a dry pan that required
frequent dumping the hopper closet pos-
sessed a water seal, that is, a constant vol-
ume of water that served as a buffer
between the atmosphere and pipes where
wastes were being collected. This seal
excluded sewer gas from entering the
home and effectively buried foul-smelling
excrement [30]. 
Mechanical valves aided water seals
to further block sewer gas from entering
the home through toilets. The Washburn &
Moore Manufacturing Company, in an
1884 advertisement titled “No More
Sickness and Death from Sewer-Gas,”
marketed the C Valve with the following
words: “We plug out sewer-gas with a
solid brass valve at top of trap.… C repre-
sents a solid brass valve ground to the out-
let, perfectly tight, preventing the escape
into the room of any gases from the sewer-
pipe, and making it impossible for water
either to syphon or evaporate from the
trap” [31].
An additional development that
achieved the goal of excluding unpleasant
odors was siphonic action, a powerful
flushing mechanism in which atmospheric
pressure forced liquid to flow from one
level to another by way of circular cur-
rents. Waring and George Jennings discov-
ered siphonic action in the 1880s. It quick-
ly replaced the wash-out flushing mecha-
nisms of hopper closets in which “flush-
ing” merely entailed the pushing of waste
into drain pipes by pouring water into the
toilet. The wash-out flush did not thor-
oughly remove waste and contaminated
water while water was being poured into
the bowl, resulting in incompletely dis-
posed contents. Siphonic action mecha-
nisms were popular for their whisking
away of any and all waste, although the
cost of their implementation and use was
An: Sewer gas 85considerably higher than that of manual
flushing devices.
SEWER GAS EXCLUSION,
MICROBIAL ERADICATION, AND
THE SANITARY-
BACTERIOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS
Siphonic action not only excluded
sewer gas from the bathroom: it also
removed dirt, grime, and germs.
Bacteriology and the germ theory provid-
ed a new vocabulary with which previous
health practices could be discussed and
older fears could be reformulated in what
amounted to a “sanitary-bacteriological
synthesis.” More generally, the “sanitary-
bacteriological synthesis” was negotiated
during the mid-to-late-nineteenth century
among doctors, scientists, engineers, gov-
ernment officials, and the general public.
It served as “… a new way of understand-
ing, explaining, and combating the prob-
lem of disease in modern society … in
which the overriding concern of the early
and mid-nineteenth-century sanitary
movement with filth, contamination,
cleanliness, and behavior was integrated
through the language of bacteriology into
a new set of perceptions and practices”
[32]. Such developments occurred “along-
side a new germ-centered focus on the
danger of contact with sick or suspect bod-
ies … and substances associated with
them, as well as on the possibility of con-
trol through interventions derived from
laboratory science.” Siphonic action and
the language with which it was described
catered both to previous fears of sewer gas
and developing fears of germs, allowing
for the transition from sewer gas to germ
theory. Water seals in toilets, for example,
first developed to block unpleasant odors
and sewer gas, were later reinforced in
practice in order to exclude bacteria from
entering the home.
The Potteries Selling Company of
Trenton, New Jersey, drew its audience’s
attention to both sewer gas and germs as
late as 1910 in order to market the “Sy-
Clo” Toilet. The toilet possessed a water
seal that covered the pipe connecting the
bowl to underground waste pipes. This
water seal protected the homeowner from
both sewer gas and airborne microbes: “If
the outlet is not covered, poisonous gases
and disease germs must sooner or later
escape into the house and sickness is cer-
tain to follow; it may simply mean that
you are going to feel miserable, or it may
be some serious disease” [23].
On the following page of the Potteries
Selling Company’s pamphlet the water
seal was advertised as such: “Its seal, that
is to say the body of water which prevents
the sewer gas from escaping, is deep,
broad, and always in plain sight, and can-
not be broken under any circumstances.”
This quotation reveals the seal’s useful-
ness against sewer gas. On another page
the seal was claimed to protect against
microbes: “These microbes get into hous-
es through pipes of imperfect closet bowls,
but it is absolutely impossible for them to
work their way through the water seals of
a Sy-Clo Closet.” Clearly, then, the
Potteries Selling Company played on pub-
lic fears of both sewer gas and germs. One
could combat both enemies at the same
time simply by purchasing its bathroom
fixture. Practices formerly developed to
combat sewer gas-like water seal installa-
tion-were used to combat germs as well.
“Layman” similarly targeted both
sewer gas and germs but felt that the latter
was receiving too little attention by the
mid-1880s. Water seals were not enough,
he claimed, to eradicate germs in the bath-
room, although they effectively prevented
sewer gas leakage. His treatise represents
a growing divergence between sewer gas
and germ warfare. The former had been
handled appropriately through 1884; the
latter, however, required new measures
unique to its character.
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nature of germs, their ability to stick to
bathroom fixtures and become lodged in
cracks and crevices. Accordingly,
“Layman” called for two developments in
bathroom fixtures and appliances: non-
corrosive material and open structures.
The interest in improving the quality of the
material used in bathroom architecture
stemmed from prior attempts to use
stronger material in the construction of
sewer pipes. The call for open structures as
opposed to enclosed bathtubs and toilets,
however, was unique to the sanitarian’s
war against germs.
In a manner consistent with the “sani-
tary-bacteriological synthesis,” preoccu-
pation with sewer gas paved the way for
the battle against germs in the bathroom.
Just as sanitarians called for iron soil pipes
in houses instead of lead or copper pipes in
order to prevent sewer gas leakage, porce-
lain, marble, and vitreous china entered
the scene in bathrooms in order to eradi-
cate germs. Calls for white, nonporous
surfaces that could be scoured until gleam-
ing mirrored terrifying demonstrations
that “the densest stone walls are easily
penetrated by [sewer] gases” [35].
Tiled floors and porcelain-enameled
toilets, tubs, and sinks appeared in the
bathroom out of a fear that previously-
used materials would harbor the growth of
germs. Wooden cabinets, metal bathtubs
and the like were thought to be easily
cracked or corroded, allowing for the hid-
den development of bacterial colonies. As
a result, commercial industries like Kohler
produced porcelain-enameled bathroom
appliances, claiming their sturdiness and
resistance to corrosion and erosion: “[The]
enameled tub — when produced in 1911
as a single, ‘sanitary’ piece, without
crevices, joints, or seams — turned the
Kohler Company into a nationally recog-
nized producer of plumbing fixtures” [36].
Other companies like the Potteries Selling
Company turned to the use of china-sup-
posedly stronger than cast iron appliances
enameled with porcelain-in their products:
We use china for our tableware because no
other substance can be kept so pure, sweet
and wholesome. It might be said by some that
enameled iron ware is stronger than china,
but a moment’s thought will show that this is
a fallacy. Its enamel will easily chip off and
leave a rusting place which will create an
odor and afford a lodging place for disease
germs.… No closet bowl should be allowed
in the house which is not made of china,
because no other material is or can be so
clean and sanitary [37]. 
The Potteries Selling Company mar-
keted its china toilet upon the public’s
fears of germs growing in the crevices of
damaged bathroom fixtures.
Bathtubs were especially marketed in
the 1890s by manufacturing companies’
touting their sturdiness. The Stewart
Ceramic Company of New York stated in
Scribner’s Magazine in 1893, “Get the
best. Do not risk your health by using
materials that will leak, absorb, decay, and
become malodorous and infectious” [38].
Their tubs were “imperishable, well-
glazed, non-porous, and as easily cleansed
as a dinner plate.” Likewise, the Standard
Manufacturing Company of Pittsburgh
guaranteed the quality of their porcelain-
lined bathtubs in 1896, a product
“unmixed with guess-work” [39].
Porcelain and china were appealing
not only for their sturdiness, but also for
their whiteness. Advertisers claimed that
this whiteness could make dirt more easily
visible — visible for cleaning, that is:
“Not only did this style [of free-standing,
porcelain or china toilets] eliminate the
dangers of hidden work inside the [wood-
en] cabinet areas; it also provided bath-
room surfaces that could be scoured more
effectively” [40]. Even outside the bath-
room, manufacturing companies adver-
tised the use of porcelain-enamel for these
reasons:
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porcelain, moulded into one piece, lines every
food compartment. The whiteness makes
every corner light as day, so you can see any-
thing spilled there. The glaze enables you to
wipe it up with a cloth. That’s about all the
cleaning ever necessary. Healthful because
they are never uncleanly. The only refrigera-
tors that are absolutely odorless. Durable
because the porcelain never breaks. Nothing
can [g]raze, crack nor peel [41]. 
This example demonstrates the fluidi-
ty with which theories permeated different
health practices. Ideas on sewer gas exclu-
sion could be transformed to keep dirt and
germs from lodging in cracks in bathroom
fixtures, as well as keep odors out of
refrigerators in the kitchen. In another
advertisement, from McClure’s Magazine,
an enamel pantry provided “a germ-proof,
easily cleaned surface. Wiping with a
damp cloth is all that is necessary.…
Anyone can do it” [42].
ERADICATING GERMS IN THE
BATHROOM AND THE EARLY
WANING OF SEWER GAS
The fascination with nonporous mate-
rials in the bathroom did not, however,
merely remain as an offshoot of sewer gas
exclusion practice. This interest took
unique turns on its own, evolving into prac-
tices that no longer combated sewer gas.
For example, the widespread disappearance
of carpets in bathrooms had little to do with
sewer gas fears but wholly with microbial
fears. One advertisement for hardwood
floors (that they should replace carpets)
claimed, “Good health, not less than good
taste, demands the elimination of carpets
from our homes. These garner and dissem-
inate poisonous germs of many kinds, and
fill the room with minute particles of dust
which are constantly respired” [43]. 
An anonymous physician wrote to the
Herald of Health to clarify the relationship
between carpets and disease:
The truth is that they [carpets], more than any
article of furniture, more even than the walls
of the room, gather and retain dust; and this
dust, though chiefly inorganic, and compara-
tively harmless, contains organic germs,
which only need to be raised into the air and
taken into the human economy, to develop the
active disease; creating, under favorable cir-
cumstances, an epidemic [44]. 
The decorative features of mid-nine-
teenth-century bathrooms, like carpets and
draperies, gave way to the modern bath-
room at the turn of the century “as an
overtly industrial ensemble of porcelain-
enameled equipment, with white, wash-
able surfaces that reflected contemporary
theories of hygiene” [45].
The bathroom revolution included not
only changes in building materials but
also, as “Layman” discussed, changes in
overall structure from enclosed fixtures to
free-standing tubs and toilets. This shift
was a response not to sewer gas fears but
to microbial fears. For example, the open
toilet rose to ascendancy over the toilet
enclosed by wooden cabinetry. “Layman”
stated, “The usual manner of inclosing the
ordinary water-closet in wood, very fre-
quently combining it with a washstand and
bathing-tub, converts the inclosure into a
kind of open sewer, almost as dangerous to
health as the old-time connections that
have long been discarded” [46]. As a
result, enclosed toilets encouraged the
growth of bacteria:
The necessary conditions for the development
of bacteria are known to be: foul emanations,
warmth, and absence of light; and all these
conditions are present in such inclosures,
even those which are most carefully guarded
against sewer gas. The organisms escaping
with the feces are carried by the gases into
contact with the surfaces surrounding water-
closets and may there germinate and decom-
pose, loading the atmosphere with the deadly
agents which we have been at so much pains
and expense to exclude.
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of technology which itself developed the
potential to house poisons, enclosed toilets
built for one’s convenience in the home
developed the potential to house bacterial
colonies. The Sanitary Association
claimed that bacteria from feces and stag-
nant waste grew easily in enclosed toilets
because of the lack of light and the entrap-
ment of warm air and foul odors. Hence,
the organization and “Layman” believed
that open toilets inhibited the growth of
bacteria. Growing acceptance of the germ
theory taught Americans that bacteria were
often pathogenic. Their growth in homes
was synonymous with an invitation for
disease.
The free-standing bathtub and toilet
also grew popular because such arrange-
ments allowed for the exposure of wash-
able surfaces. Prior to 1880, the aesthetics
of bathroom architecture dictated that the
goal of the designer was to hide all fixtures
as much as possible. However, in the next
decade, encasements gradually disap-
peared, bathtubs were lifted off of the
ground and supported by small claw-feet
at the corners, and toilets were erected to
expose all parts for cleaning, especially the
sides and back. Elevating the bathtub off of
the ground allowed homeowners to clean
the floor underneath it; bathtubs were also
moved away from corners in order to make
them accessible for cleaning [47]. 
In conclusion, the bathroom changed
from a bedroom-like chamber to a “hospi-
tal-within-the-home” [48] beginning in the
1880s due to fears of both sewer gas and
microbes. Mechanical valves and hopper
closets were developed in order to more
effectively exclude sewer gas from enter-
ing the bathroom. Manufacturing compa-
nies feverishly built newer models of
traps, toilets, and bathtubs that both
encouraged and satisfied public demand.
Practices to exclude sewer gas leakage
into the home also made sense in light of
the germ theory, leading to the develop-
ment of stronger, nonporous materials
with which bathtubs, sinks, bathroom
floors and walls (tiles), and toilets were
built. Iron, originally introduced to con-
struct stronger pipes to prevent sewer gas
leakage, had evolved into porcelain and
china to prevent germs from lodging in
cracks.
The adoption of free-standing fixtures
with exposed surfaces that allowed for
scouring catered to fears of germs alone.
In fact, beginning in the 1890s, when the
germ theory took a firmer foothold in the
United States, bathroom developments
reflected a stronger obsession with germs
than with sewer gas. From the standpoint
of most observers in the 1890s, the vague
threat of sewer gas paled in comparison to
recent discoveries that linked specific
germs to specific contagious diseases.
“Layman,” in 1887, while cautioning the
householder against the threat of sewer
gas, more strongly warned against the
threat of pathogenic microbes: “But there
is another source of pollution [in addition
to sewer gas] present in almost every
house which has not yet received the gen-
eral recognition it deserves” [49]. The new
threat eventually sounded the death knell
of sewer gas.
SEWER GAS: A MERE GENERAL
VAGUE IMPRESSION
On May 30, 1894, Dr. Abraham
Jacobi announced, in front of fellow
physicians and scientists across the coun-
try, “There is a general vague impression
among the public [regarding sewer gas],
but I never saw a case or could prove one”
[50]. By the mid-1890s clinicians fol-
lowed Jacobi and began to question the
veracity of the sewer gas theory, wonder-
ing if fears of sewer gas were grounded in
contemporary scientific principles. In
order to explore such possibilities, a
nation-wide conference was organized by
the Congress of American Physicians and
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New York City, where Jacobi, the nation’s
most renowned pediatrician and professor
of medicine at the College of Physicians
and Surgeons, made the case against sewer
gas.
His arguments were little concerned
with malodorous influences found in the
bathroom, nor did they address the cre-
ation of poisonous, encased environments
where sewer gas could accumulate along-
side collections of germs. Instead, Jacobi
turned his medical audience not to what
could be detected by crude smell or sight,
but to the world of microorganisms and
their nature — that which required micro-
scopes and laboratory testing for visual-
ization and understanding. Bacteriology
provided the tools for Jacobi’s arguments.
He showed by experiment that the content
of the air from sewers contained fewer
microorganisms than atmospheric air and
concluded that “specific germs are
destroyed by the process of putrefaction in
the sewers,” thus rendering the air from
sewers harmless [51]. Henceforth, the
truth of disease threats was to be found in
laboratory methods and in the quantitative
measurement of microbes.
What caused this shift in ideas regard-
ing sewer gas? How did the sewer gas
framework for disease etiology slowly
crumble at the turn of the century? In the
first blow to the sewer gas framework,
beginning in 1876, several scientists began
to consider sewer gas a harmless medium
by which the real perpetrator, germs, trav-
eled. Such beliefs constituted a “germs in
sewer gas framework,” an intermediate
theory that both acknowledged sewer gas
as a distinct entity and encouraged the
practice of sewer gas exclusion from the
home. The germs in sewer gas framework
lasted into the 1890s.
Asecond development that threatened
the legitimacy of sewer gas (and broke
down the compromising germs in sewer
gas framework) was the rise of bacterio-
logical contagionism and the New Public
Health. Bacteriological contagionism
emphasized the person infected with path-
ogenic microbes — not spaces — as dis-
seminator of disease. The New Public
Health, similarly, was concerned with the
surveillance of specific microbes in popu-
lations, not sewer gas. Jacobi led the
assault against aerial and spatial notions of
disease transmission beginning in 1888,
while Charles V. Chapin, the nation’s lead-
ing public health figure at the turn of the
century, shaped laws and health practices
to mirror heavily contagionist beliefs from
the 1890s onwards.
Bacteriologist and public health pio-
neer C.-E.A. Winslow initiated a third
development — the final, fatal blow-that
completed the dismantling of sewer gas by
the first decade of the twentieth century. In
1907, Winslow carried out laboratory
experiments that revealed that bacteria did
not hover in volumes of air. He demon-
strated that not only were bacteria absent
in sewer gas; their nature also prevented
them from being flung into a suspended
state in the air. The effect was that the
threat of sewer gas dissipated after 1910.
In sewer gas’s place stood germs.
A TEMPORARY SOLUTION: THE
“GERMS IN SEWER GAS
FRAMEWORK”
As early as 1876 the finding that there
were no significant deviations in the
chemical composition of sewer gas com-
pared to atmospheric air was made by
Professor William H. Brewer of Yale
University. Tens of reports both in the
United States and in Britain confirmed
such findings, leading to scientific debates
whether sewer gas was dangerous. Was
sewer gas dangerous or merely a vessel for
the transport of dangerous germs?
William Paul Gerhard, a pupil of
Waring and sanitary engineer in New
York, outlined the conflict between sewer
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He was aware that many scientists and
plumbers like Waring believed that sewer
gas itself — which was largely organic
vapor, or gases given off by decomposing
waste and fecal matter — could produce
any one of the so-called “filth diseases”
such as nausea, headache, or vomiting.
However, he was convinced that sewer gas
served to contain “microscopic spores or
germs which live and feed upon such
organic vapor and are capable of repro-
duction under favorable conditions, such
as presence of putrefying filth, excess of
moisture, heat, lack of oxygen, etc.” [53].
The belief that sewer gas houses harmful
germs and mediates their movement is
what this author calls the “germs in sewer
gas framework.”
This subtle but important transition
was apparent in an article by Dr. J. Soyka
of the University of Munich, translated
and printed for an American audience in
1882. Soyka lamented “the tendency [in
Germany] being greatly to exaggerate the
danger [of sewer gas]” [54]. Soyka’s
lament was founded in a belief in disease
specificity, one significant implication of
the germ theory. Soyka, like Jacobi, cited
the need for a one-to-one unique relation-
ship between microbes and different dis-
eases. Sewer gas did not fulfill such a cri-
terion:
In considering the subject, all cases of sudden
death or illness caused by inhaling [sewer
gas] may be left out of the question, for what
is now to be dealt with is not sewer poisoning,
but the spread of certain diseases … which
arise in consequence of the reception into the
system of an organism. … It is not pretended
that the foul gas in sewers can give birth to
the germs of typhus, diphtheria, etc., but only
that such gases serve as the medium in which
these organisms are suspended and conveyed
to the patient.
Soyka concluded that “positive proof
of a connection between sewer gases and
the spread of epidemic disease is wanti-
ng.”
The germs in sewer gas framework
adequately satisfied fears of both sewer
gas and germs, resulting in its long tenure
from roughly the mid-1870s through the
1890s. Although sewer gas was no longer
blamed for directly causing a variety of
diseases in this framework, it was still
associated with aiding and abetting the
work of harmful microbes. Dr. Job Lewis
Smith, an influential American pediatri-
cian alongside Jacobi, subscribed to this
idea, stating in 1886, “The atmosphere in
which the child lives should be free from
noxious gases and organic matter in which
micro-organisms are developed and
thrive” [55].
The Philadelphia Board of Health in
1882 likewise described the problem of
sewer gas in the language of the germ the-
ory: “With the presence of filth of every
description, a sluggish current, moisture,
heat, germs of disease, and the absence of
circulation of fresh air, nothing more
seems to be required for calling into activ-
ity those processes which give to sewer air
its poisonous qualities” [56].
A MILIEU HOSTILE TO SEWER
GAS: DISEASE SPECIFICITY AND
BACTERIOLOGICAL
CONTAGIONISM
This happy medium, however — the
framework of sewer gas plus germ theory
— started to break in 1888 because of
growing belief in disease specificity, con-
tagionism, and the New Public Health. In
1888 Jacobi published an article question-
ing the sewer gas theory on grounds that
sewer gas was not disease specific. Jacobi
raised the question, “Can these foul exha-
lations produce alike diphtheria, typhoid,
and dysentery” [57]? Dr. Louis Fischer of
the New York Medical School similarly
claimed, “Now, do micro-organisms
develop different diseases under different
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develop typhoid, the same germ diphthe-
ria, or scarlatina, or measles? My answer
is, Not any more than we should expect to
have potatoes grow from pumpkin seeds”
[58]. Notions of disease specificity trig-
gered closer examination of the nature of
germs — how they spread and where they
were most prevalent.
That sewer gas might serve as a medi-
um in which the bacterium for diphtheria
grew and was disseminated was largely
ignored by Jacobi, who lamented what he
believed to be an even larger threat to
health — those infected with diphtheria
itself. As such, Jacobi’s objection to sewer
gas not only was grounded in theory but
also held practical ramifications. He wrote
in 1888, based on clinical experiences, “…
I have often found a professional bother
inspecting traps and cellar floors, while
the rest of the children of a family were
permitted to play in the rooms and about
the beds of those affected with the mala-
dy” [59].
Jacobi’s emphasis on the carriers of
disease and the infected brings to light one
camp of scientists and physicians at the
turn of the century: the bacteriological
contagionists. Most bacteriological conta-
gionists, like Providence Superintendent
of Health Charles V. Chapin and bacteriol-
ogist C.-E.A. Winslow, likewise objected
to the harmfulness of sewer gas and
instead indicted individuals infected with
pathogenic microbes for spreading dis-
ease. In the other camp could be found the
anticontagionists (or filth theorists) who
focused on the presence of disease-caus-
ing microbes everywhere. Sewer gas was
one locale where the presence of microbes
should not be ignored, according to them.
However, such distinctions between
contagionists and filth theorists are rela-
tively artificial and grew more of a func-
tion of how scientists at the turn of the
century aligned themselves in professional
journals. In fact, at the turn of the century,
both contagionists and latter-day anticon-
tagionists believed that on a basic level
germs caused (or could cause) disease.
They also held that specific microbes
caused specific diseases. How they dif-
fered, then, lay in their emphasis —
objects versus people — which was a
function of their slightly different ideas on
the nature of germs. Did germs fly? How
did they travel from one location to anoth-
er? Could a person infected with diphthe-
ria transmit the disease to another by sim-
ply touching him or her?
Anticontagionists such as Waring
believed that harmful germs were
omnipresent. This stemmed from associa-
tions of germs with air. Indeed, for anti-
contagionists, germs were like air particles
— found everywhere, floating, and resting
in and about objects — and they were poi-
sonous to the body. Fumigation and sewer
gas exclusion practices, then, made sense
in light of such an understanding of the
nature of germs. Infected persons did not
pose a threat to anticontagionists except
for the expired air that they exhaled. The
association of germs with air stemmed
from earlier beliefs in miasmas and was
therefore easy to make.
Bacteriological contagionists, on the
other hand, did not conceive of any inher-
ent likeness between air particles and
germs. For them, the germ theory was
truly opposed to the miasmatic theory of
disease. Germs, unlike air particles, aggre-
gated in certain areas, especially in sick
individuals. Sewer gas was only relevant
so far as it hindered the individual’s
immune response — its resistance — to
invading microbes. Jacobi wrote in 1894,
“The impossibility or great improbability
of specific diseases rising from sewers into
our houses … must, however, not lull our
citizens and authorities into indolence and
carelessness. For the general health is suf-
fering from chemical exhalations, and the
vitality of cell life and the power of resis-
tance are undermined by them” [60]. But
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paled in comparison to warnings about
exposure to persons infected with conta-
gious diseases. The infected person served
as a concentrated locale for swarming
germs.
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND THE
CONVERSION OF CHARLES V.
CHAPIN
Charles V. Chapin provided the foun-
dations of the public health movement in
the twentieth century and was thus the
most influential public health officer in the
United States at the turn of the century. He
fiercely fought the contagionist battle by
directing his efforts at isolating individuals
carrying infectious microbes. He spear-
headed the beginnings of the New Public
Health, a term used by historians of medi-
cine to describe a largely laboratory-based
public health in the early-twentieth centu-
ry that focused on the surveillance and
control of pathogenic microbes (often
masked in healthy bodies) in populations.
The New Public Health was interested in
tracking harmful microbes and less con-
cerned with sanitizing the environment.
Ironically, Chapin believed in the dan-
gers of sewer gas early in his career as a
physician and as Providence’s
Superintendent of Public Health, a title
that he held from 1884 until 1932. His
public health records demonstrate a belief
in the relationship between sewer gas, dis-
ease, and household health. He kept all
records of typhoid fever, diphtheria, and
scarlet fever cases in Providence from the
1870s through the first decade of the twen-
tieth century. Each record contained two
sections: a biographical sketch of the
afflicted and a description of the “condi-
tion of the premises [of the sick]” [61]. In
this section of the report were inspectors’
comments on “foul odors” and the “source
of foul odors.” In one reported case of
typhoid fever, Bessie Cashman of 47 Bates
Street, Providence, lived in a home where
the privy vault was “partly full and very
offensive and not properly covered.”
Sanitary Inspector John S. Rogers, under
the authority of Chapin, further noted that
there were no traps in the house and that
the kitchen sink, where sewer gas leakage
could occur, was offensive by smell.
The medical records of physicians
additionally indicates the relationship
between disease and the home under
Chapin. He had doctors fill out five-by-
seven-inch cards for every diagnosed case
of typhoid fever in Providence from 1895
to 1905. On the front side of the card was
the patient’s name, age, date of diagnosis,
and school or work affiliation. On the back
side of the card in 1895 were blanks to be
filled out by the sanitary inspector regard-
ing the patient’s residence: the condition
of the bathrooms, the pipes and drains in
the house, traps, plumbing fixtures like
toilets, sinks, and bathtubs, and cesspools.
Such inquiries illuminate the public health
belief that typhoid fever was a problem of
the home and of sewer emanations.
However, in 1905, these cards had
changed significantly, reflecting an epi-
demiology that no longer indicted sewer
gas for causing disease. By 1905, such
cards, rather than noting information con-
cerning household architecture and
plumbing, contained detailed information
regarding sources of water, ice, milk,
seafood, vegetables, and fruit. Fears of
sewer gas had subsided by the first decade
of the twentieth century as fears of water
and food contaminated by bacteria pre-
dominated the etiological scene [62]. 
Chapin epitomizes the radical shift
from sewer gas theory to a germ theory
framework that could no longer consider
sewer gas a serious threat to health. In
1889, in conjunction with his belief in the
germ theory of disease, he believed that
“there are three ways in which the typhoid
organisms can gain access to the body: in
the inspired air, in the drink, and in the
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reported where three young ladies, guests
in a large hotel, who slept close by a privy
containing typhoid stools, were attacked
[with typhoid fever], although their food
and drink were above suspicion.”
Ten years later, in 1899, Chapin no
longer regarded aerial infection as a sig-
nificant means by which typhoid fever
spread within a population. Instead, he
cited drinking water, milk, the house fly,
and direct contact with infected persons as
being the means by which the disease
could be contracted [64]. Specific mention
of sewer gas does not occur in either of
these alleged etiologies of typhoid fever,
although that the 1889 account implies
modes of disease transmission consistent
with sewer gas (and does not discuss
infected persons) and the 1899 account
excludes such references (and additionally
includes infected persons) is telling of
Chapin’s shift in beliefs.
How and why did Chapin change his
views on modes of infection between 1889
and 1899? Why did public health records
and note cards change in content between
1895 and 1905? Careful observations of
epidemiological patterns in Providence
caused Chapin’s change of heart.
Meticulous record-keeping in the form of
Chapin’s index cards, for example, and
stronger demands for tighter correlation
between agents of disease and disease
occurrence allowed for a gradual shift in
belief from anticontagionism to conta-
gionism.
Jacobi and Chapin, two medical
giants in America, boldly challenged the
compromising germs in sewer gas frame-
work from 1888 through the 1890s. This
theory, they claimed, did not hold against
the evidence for an increased emphasis on
infected bodies as opposed to infected
spaces. Interestingly, this evidence came
not in the form of laboratory experimental
results but from close examination of dis-
ease occurrence. Jacobi’s observational
position as a clinician and Chapin’s as a
public health officer allowed the two men
to conclude that disease etiology was not
only microbial but also non-aerial. Such
beliefs are embodied in bacteriological
contagionism and the New Public Health.
DEBUNKING SEWER GAS: THE
LABORATORY EVIDENCE AND 
C.-E.A. WINSLOW
If one development in the late-nine-
teenth century were to be singled out as the
most significant influence on the fall of
sewer gas, it would be the rise of the labo-
ratory and microbiology. A shift from the
crudely perceivable to the microscopically
visible was made possible by laboratory
testing and experimentation. No longer did
imagination (of germs and their activity)
and foul smells (of fecal odors and waste)
determine understanding. No longer, even,
did a sick-looking or healthy-feeling per-
son determine the wellness of an individ-
ual. Instead, determination of wellness and
hazards to health lay increasingly in the
hands of the bacteriologist in the laborato-
ry. As such, the nature of germs as discov-
ered by experts behind the microscope was
brought to the forefront of disease etiology.
In addition to discovering that sewer
gas did not contain significant numbers of
bacteria, scientists explored the way bacte-
ria traveled from one place or person to
another. This could not have been
explored without the laboratory. C.-E.A.
Winslow, regarded “nationally and inter-
nationally as the elder statesman of the
public health movement” [65] in his time,
conducted remarkable laboratory research
that would definitively debunk the sewer
gas theory.
Born in 1877 and raised in Boston,
Charles-Edward Amory Winslow earned
both bachelor and master of science
degrees from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and thereafter, from 1902
to 1910, served on the faculty of M.I.T.,
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head of the Sanitary Laboratory. His
research centered chiefly on proper
sewage disposal and water purity, relative-
ly new fields at the turn of the century
[66]. From early on in his career, then,
Winslow utilized the laboratory in order to
observe, identify, and isolate foreign parti-
cles such as bacteria.
One heated debate that cultivated
Winslow’s interest in sewer gas was
whether bacteria could travel in the air of
sewers. At the turn of the century, several
scientists performed experiments to show
that bursting bubbles and turbulent cur-
rents led to the flinging of bacteria in sew-
erage into the air. Sir Edward Frankland of
England and Raphael Pumpelly and A. C.
Abbott of the United States, as a result,
argued that sewer gas was dangerous [67].
Other experimenters who closely exam-
ined the air of sewers arrived at different
conclusions. Scientists from Germany,
England, and the United States showed
that sewer air was similar in composition
to atmospheric air, containing no more or
less bacteria as well. This discrepancy,
then, prompted further investigation which
Winslow undertook by request of the
National Association of Master Plumbers.
In 1907, Winslow set up fifteen-foot
pipes vertically, at the bottom of which lay
1.5 liters of sewage. Air was then drawn
by an exhaust fan at the top, creating an air
flow of 620 feet per minute. This setup
effectively simulated soil-pipe conditions
in most homes. Winslow then measured
the density of airborne bacteria in the pipe
at different heights using laboratory tech-
nology. He found exactly eighteen bacteria
per liter of air two feet from the bottom,
fourteen bacteria per liter seven feet from
the bottom, and five bacteria per liter
twelve feet from the bottom of the pipe.
The normal number of bacteria per liter of
air in sewage pipes without air currents
was one or two, according to Winslow.
Hence, due to the air current, the number
of bacteria in sewer gas had risen from one
or two to five at a distance of twelve feet
from the bottom of the pipe where the
sewage lay.
Such findings indicated the relatively
harmless nature of sewer gas. The normal
rate of one or two bacteria per liter of
sewer air (motionless sewer air, that is)
was already virtually sterile in the minds
of most scientists. What was debated here,
then, was the possibility of millions of
bacteria known to exist in the sewage itself
flying up into the air of sewers in order to
render it contaminated. Winslow created
currents of 490 feet per minute, 620 feet
per minute, and 790 feet per minute in
order to variably test this possibility. He
found, however, that “when air was drawn
at various rates over the surface of one
liter of sewage … no increase of bacteria
could be demonstrated in the air.”
The significance of Winslow’s exper-
iments and results lay in his interpretation
of the facts and use of controls. Prior expe-
rience with the purity of tap water in New
York taught Winslow that bacteria there
were found in numbers twice that of sewer
air. And even then, the chance of bacterial
infection was quite low. Hence, using
quantitative figures, Winslow staunchly
held that sewer air was relatively safe, that
gases from sewers were better for breath-
ing than water from household sinks for
drinking. Winslow wrote,
Sanitation in order to be intelligent must how-
ever be quantitative. It should deal, not with
theoretical possibilities but with practical
probabilities — measured as closely as possi-
ble in regard to their quantitative importance.
I have shown in my experiments that even
under the most extreme conditions the num-
ber of bacteria which get into the air from
infected liquid is small.… In drinking New
York water, twice as many colon bacilli are
ingested every day, for 1000 cubic centime-
ters is a small amount for daily consumption.
So there would be less danger of contracting
disease from continuously breathing the air of
a vent pipe or of a soil pipe, above where liq-
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That bacteria from liquids did not and
could not readily leap into the air was a
novel finding in the early-1900s.
Quantitative laboratory techniques like
that employed by Winslow allowed for
such conclusions to be reached. They dis-
proved earlier conclusions that the mere
identification of pathogenic microbes in
sewage implied that sewer gases were
lethal. Intuitive assessments of the exis-
tence of bacteria in sewage (without exact
knowledge of the numbers of bacteria in
the air) — which heightened sewer gas
fears-were upended by quantitative exper-
iments that deemed sewer gases more safe
to breathe than it was to drink tap water.
About sewer gas Winslow also stated,
“The modern knowledge of bacteriology
will not … permit us to accept such a point
of view. Typhoid fever, and in most cases
diarrhea as well, are caused by minute
organisms adapted to a semi-aquatic life,
which could by no possible means escape
from a broken drain or a moist rubbish
heap and fly through the air in pursuit of
victims” [68].
Such powerful arguments grounded in
laboratory experiments had, by 1910,
definitively marked the fall of sewer gas.
After 1910 references to it were rare
excepting truthful observations that inhal-
ing sewer gases induced dizziness and
headaches. In one comprehensive health
guide published in 1910 entitled What
May Be Done To Improve the Hygiene of
the City Dweller, the author warned
against breathing impure air: “The next
equally important matter is how to give to
the city dweller the purest air” [69]. Sewer
gas was not included in possible sources of
impure air, although it would have held a
prominent and dependable place just
twenty years earlier. Even Waring, a once
staunch believer in sewer gas, made no
mention of it as a threat in a commence-
ment address at Yale University in 1896
about the proper disposal of sewage. In
this speech he further yielded authority on
such matters to the bacteriologist: “I am
not a bacteriologist, nor have I been able to
keep pace even in a general way with the
rapid developments of the new science”
[70].
Exploration of the nature of sewer
gas, as described earlier, reached new
standards and expectations in the bacterio-
logical laboratory by the twentieth centu-
ry. Winslow, using quantitative methods in
order to count the number of bacteria in
sewer gas, demonstrated the relative harm-
lessness of sewer gas. What allowed this
expert analysis not only to proceed but
also to debunk sewer gas as a cause of dis-
ease was a changing atmosphere in the
medical world. By the 1890s, not only did
scientists assume that germs, not gases or
odors, caused disease. They also extended
the germ theory to authoritatively state
that specific disease had specific causes in
specific microbes.
Disease specificity, bacteriological
contagionism, the strategies and preoccu-
pations of the New Public Health, and lab-
oratory science together constituted a hos-
tile milieu that led to the decline of sewer
gas as a cause of disease. In 1876, sewer
gas began descending from its status as
cause of disease (the sewer gas frame-
work) to vessel for pathogenic bacteria
(the germs in sewer gas framework). The
dismantling of sewer gas, however, went
beyond the recognition that it served as an
inert medium for microbes. After 1910,
under the influential direction of Jacobi,
Chapin, and Winslow, the germs in sewer
gas framework had given way to the germ
theory framework, whereby sewer gas was
no longer relevant to occurrences of dis-
ease. Such developments furthermore
threatened the legitimacy of sewer gas as a
real entity. In sewer gas’s place rose the
germ and the understanding that its aggre-
gation in infected persons and milk and
water supplies was to be feared. Moreover,
96 An: Sewer gasthe notion of a ubiquitous airborne poison
— otherwise known as “miasmatism” —
disappeared in America for the first time,
and in its place traceable, detectable, mea-
surable microbes were feared across the
country.
CONCLUSION: THE RISE AND
FALL OF SEWER GAS, 1870 TO
1910
The rise and fall of sewer gas in
America reveals anxiety — anxiety in a
population willing to go to great lengths to
preserve its health. Sewer gas’s construc-
tion as a real and urgent threat was rooted
in anxieties surrounding overcrowding
and stagnant waste, which led to the mas-
sive building of sewers like those systems
in Chicago and in Memphis. Ironically,
these very sewers, meant to be bastions of
human creativity and technological
genius, became themselves bastions of
death, housing sewer gases and propagat-
ing them through the urban landscape.
Both the rich and the poor, the clean and
the unclean, were defenseless against
sewer gas.
In response, engineers and plumbers
like George E. Waring, Jr. devised scores
of fixtures, appliances, and building
schemes in order to exclude sewer gas
from the private home. Traps, valves, toi-
let designs, and building blueprints were
developed according to theoretical models
concerning the nature of sewer gas: what it
was and how it moved through sewers.
From the very first, moreover, there was
just as much variety in the practical solu-
tions invented or developed as there were
theoretical descriptions of the nature of
sewer gas. Throughout the 1870s and
1880s, all the while, sewer gas maintained
its grip on the minds of Americans, claim-
ing (according to most authority) the lives
of thousands across the country — even
the President.
Sewer gas reached its height from
1878 to 1883. It was ubiquitous, finding its
way into every American home unless one
possessed perfectly-installed valves, soil
pipes, traps, and bathroom fixtures. Proper
ventilation to dilute sewer gas was further
necessary in the event that it penetrated
these defenses. In these six years, “sewer
gas” or “sewer air” was included in book
and journal titles 120 times, or at a steady
rate of about once every eighteen days.
Advertisers bombarded consumers with
hundreds of different plumbing contrap-
tions, claiming that without such devices
one could experience sewer gas poisoning
and thus die of diphtheria, typhoid fever,
diarrhea, scarlet fever, or any of a number
of frightening diseases.
The rise of the germ theory in these
six years did little to mitigate the gravity
with which Americans perceived sewer
gas, whose diverse theoretical grounding
(considering the lack of agreement con-
cerning its nature and prevention) could be
remodeled to fit the framework of germs
and disease specificity. From 1878, scien-
tists, plumbers, and manufacturing compa-
nies alike warned the public against allow-
ing sewer gas and germs into the home,
especially via the bathroom. The bathroom
was still a new room in the American
home in the late-nineteenth century, just as
extensive sewer systems were new devel-
opments in the mid-nineteenth century.
Their susceptibility to contamination and
filth was well-known, making their
upkeep vital in order to prevent disease in
the home. Whether sewer gas provided an
environment in which bacteria could
thrive, or was pathogenic in and of itself,
the message was clear, intuitive, and chal-
lenging: keep both sewer gas and germs
out of the bathroom if you want to prevent
your family from succumbing to conta-
gious diseases. Construct sound toilets,
bathtubs, and sinks and remove those
filthy carpets if you want to keep disease
out. This was the prevailing orthodoxy
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to 1883. Remnants of such feelings per-
sisted, to be sure, into the 1890s.
The pervasiveness of the germ theory,
accompanied by the preeminence of bacte-
riology, laboratory science, and the New
Public Health, provided an environment
beginning in the 1880s in which the nature
of sewer gas and of bacterial growth and
movement was explored by scientists. No
longer did the crudely visible and the
inferred suffice in order to establish dis-
ease etiology. Instead, chemical and bio-
logical analysis that made visible what
could not have been seen before helped
scientists to understand disease etiology
on a microscopic level. These new, higher
standards of disease causation made sewer
gas theory untenable by the early years of
the twentieth century. Sewer air was simi-
lar to atmospheric air, and Winslow
demonstrated in 1907 that bacteria did not
leap up from the medium of liquid to the
medium of air. In sewer gas’s place, equal-
ly feared by Americans, were lethal germs
swarming in human bodies and in food,
water, and milk.
By 1910, the germ theory framework
better fit existing notions of disease etiolo-
gy: that disease was caused by microbes
unable to fly through the air and most dan-
gerous when clustered in infected individ-
uals. Sewer gas was eventually undone by
germ theory; one can see the physical evi-
dence, for example, as early as 1887 in the
development of free-standing, open struc-
tures in the bathroom which had nothing to
do with sewer gas fears. The conversion
was made complete by Winslow’s experi-
ments in 1907. In the years after his
demonstrations, the idea that sewer gas as
either a direct cause of disease or agent by
which microbes flew through the air quick-
ly declined. Quite naturally, germs, already
pervasive in American culture, took their
place as a cause of disease. The germ theo-
ry, disease specificity, and laboratory sci-
ence made relatively quick work of a once-
fearsome enemy, relegating deadly sewer
gas to the realm of myth, superstition, and
the dim recesses of history.
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